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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

JESUS ISREAL ROSILLO,

:

CaseNo.20010268-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Priority No. 2

Appellant Jesus Rosillo was entitled at trial to an instruction on the lesser-included
offense of robbery.
As set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant, Rosillo was charged with aggravated robbery under an accomplice liability theory. According to the evidence, Rosillo
and co-defendant Andrew Mallory took personal property from Steven Lund. During the
robbery, Mallory pulled out an object that Rosillo recognized as a gun. Rosillo testified
that when he saw the gun, he got scared and wanted to keep Mallory calm; he went
"along with" the robbery out of panic and fear.
Under the law, Rosillo may not be responsible for Mallory's conduct.
He may be responsible for a criminal act only to the degree of his own mental
state. Evidence supports that Rosillo was not an accomplice to the use of the gun. Thus,
the jury should have been instructed on the lesser-included offense of robbery.
The state does not dispute relevant portions of Rosillo's argument on appeal.
Rather, the state claims that based on its interpretation of the evidence, Rosillo could not

have been convicted of robbery because he maintained innocence in the matter. The state
is incorrect. The evidence supports the lesser-offense instruction. Thus, Rosillo
respectfully requests the entry of an order reversing the judgment and remanding this
case for a new trial.
ARGUMENT
THE STATE HAS FAILED TO CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE IN THE
LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO ROSILLO'S REQUEST FOR THE
LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTION. THUS, THE STATE'S
ARGUMENT ON APPEAL IS NOT PERSUASIVE.
In August 2000, the state charged Rosillo with aggravated robbery under an
accomplice-liability theory. According to the state's evidence, two men identified as
Rosillo and Mallory approached Steven Lund while he was inside a shuttle van at the
vacuum stalls for the Ute Car Wash on 300 South and 300 East. When Lund emerged
from the shuttle van, he turned around and observed Mallory pointing a gun at him. He
also observed Rosillo standing beside Mallory. (R. 144:13-16.) The men ordered Lund
to hand over his money and wallet, and after Lund complied, the men took the property
and walked away. (R. 144:16-19; 145:14-15.)
Rosillo and Mallory were arrested a short time later, and officers discovered a wad
of cash on each co-defendant. (See.R. 144:47-50, 62-68.) Police also located a gun and
a wallet at an apartment that Rosillo and Mallory shared with their families. (See R.
144:77-80.) A complete statement of the facts is set forth in the opening Brief of
Appellant. (See Brief of Appellant, dated July 30, 2001 ("Brief of Appellant"), at 3-7.)
2

At trial, Rosillo asked the judge to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense
of robbery. (R. 78; 145:53.) The judge denied the request. (R. 145:53-54.) Rosillo is
challenging the trial judge's ruling on the matter in this appeal.
As set forth in Rosillo's opening Brief of Appellant, to begin the analysis, Utah
courts have ruled that when a defendant requests an instruction on a lesser-included
offense, the trial court must provide the instruction to the jury if "(i) the statutory
elements of [the] greater and lesser included offenses overlap to some degree, and (ii) the
evidence provides a 'rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense
charged and convicting him of the included offense.1" State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 424
(Utah 1986) (quoting State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah 1983)); see State v. Evans.
2001 UT 22, Tfl8, 20 P.3d 888; State v. Jones. 878 P.2d 1175, 1176-77 (Utah Ct. App.
1994); Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-402(3)(a), (4) (1999) (hereinafter the "Baker" analysis).
Also, in considering the above factors, the court must view the evidence and
reasonable inferences "in the light most favorable to the defense." State v. Crick. 675
P.2d 527, 532 (Utah 1983); State v. Kruger. 2000 UT 60, ^14, 6 P.3d 1116. If there is
"some rational basis" in the evidence on which the jury could consider the lesser offense,
the instruction must be given. Hansen. 734 P.2d at 424.
In this case, the state has conceded the first prong of the Baker analysis, and other
relevant points as discussed below. See infra subpoint A., herein. However, the state
disputes that a rational basis existed in the evidence to find Rosillo guilty of the lesser
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offense. The state's argument fails to consider the facts and inferences in the light most
favorable to Rosillo. When the evidence and inferences are properly considered, they
compel the determination that Rosillo was entitled to have the jury instructed on the lesser
offense of robbery. See infra subpoints B. and C, herein.
A. THE STATE HAS MADE IMPORTANT CONCESSIONS AND
OBSERVATIONS SUPPORTING THE LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE
INSTRUCTION IN THIS CASE.
The state acknowledges that under the first prong of the Baker analysis, "robbery
is a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery." (State's Brief at 10). "[T]he
statutory elements of [the] greater and lesser included offenses overlap to some degree."
Hansen, 734 P.2d at 424 (quoting Baker, 671 P.2d at 159). Also, in the context of this
case, under the second prong of the Baker analysis, "defendant established a rational basis
in the evidence upon which the jury could have acquitted him of aggravated robbery."
(State's Brief at 11.)
On appeal, the state disputes only the second part of the Baker analysis. That is,
the state claims the evidence failed to provide a rational basis for convicting Rosillo of
robbery. The state's claims are insupportable.
As set forth below, the primary dispute in the evidence concerned co-defendant
Mallory's use of a dangerous weapon, and whether Rosillo directed, solicited, requested,
commanded, encouraged, or aided in the use of that weapon. (See R. 145:68-70, 71-72.)
Since jurors were required to resolve disputes and contradictions in the evidence as they
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related to that primary issue, the jurors should have been given adequate choices and
instructions under the law on the matter. In that regard, the jury should have been
instructed on the lesser-included offense of robbery.
B. THE STATE CLAIMS THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
A CONVICTION ON THE LESSER OFFENSE OF ROBBERY. YET. UNDER
THE STANDARD FOR LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS.
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS PROVIDING THE INSTRUCTION TO THE
JURY.
The state acknowledges that in reviewing a defendant's request for an instruction
on a lesser-included offense, this Court will "liberally construe[] the Baker requirements"
to permit the instruction. (State's Brief at 9.) Also, the evidence and inferences must be
interpreted in favor of the defendant's request for the instruction. Where the evidence is
"ambiguous and susceptible to alternative explanations, the trial court must give the
lesser included offense instruction if any one of the alternative interpretations provides
both a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and
convicting him of the included offense." (State's Brief at 11 (cite omitted).)
The state recognizes that the standard identified above supports the fundamental
policy that a jury must be permitted to elect between the appropriate greater and lesser
offenses that fit the facts, rather than between the first-degree aggravated felony charge
the prosecutor chose to file, and acquittal. (State's Brief at 9.)
Notwithstanding the concessions, the state argues that while the evidence pro-

5

vided a rational basis for acquitting Rosillo of aggravated robbery, that "same evidence"
(State's Brief at 12) was insufficient to support a conviction on the lesser offense under
the second prong of the Baker analysis. That is, according to the state, if evidence served
to acquit Rosillo of the greater charge, the evidence also "necessarily led to an acquittal
on the lesser offense." (State's Brief at 12.) In connection with that argument, the state
has cited to State v. Shabata. 678 P.2d 785, 790 (Utah 1984); State v. Crick, 675 P.2d
527, 533-34 (Utah 1983); Baker, 671 P.2d at 160; State v. Cox. 826 P.2d 656, 662-63
(Utah Ct. App. 1992); and State v. Sherard. 818 P.2d 554, 560 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The
state's argument is unpersuasive and should be rejected for the following reasons.
(1) The state9s argument is incorrect as a matter of law. In the event this case
concerned an aggravated robbery where accomplice liability was not alleged, the state's
argument may be correct: A defendant's claim of innocence necessarily would support
innocence on all lesser included offenses. For example, if Lund had emerged from
vacuuming the van to face one suspect, that single suspect's claim at trial that he was not
involved in the matter necessarily would support an acquittal both on the greater charge
and the lesser included offense. See Shabata, 678 P.2d at 787, 790 (defendant claimed
he did not meet with the victim on the day of the murder and he did not murder the
victim; defendant was precluded from presenting a manslaughter instruction since he
claimed innocence with respect to the entire act).
This case does not present that situation. This case concerns accomplice liability.

6

e liability is an element of the crime that must be
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The state dues not dispute that the prosecution was required to prove accomplice
liability in this case. (See State's Brief atlO.) To that end, to support a conviction, on the
charged offense, the state was required to establish a robbery, the aggravating circumstance, and acuunpluv lulnllfh
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Stated another way, under the law, while an accomplice may be found liable for an
act, he is not necessarily responsible for the co-defendant's act. State v. Alvarez, 872
P.2d 450, 461-62 (Utah 1994) (recognizing accomplices may have different criminal
intent in the commission of an offense; some parties may intend assault while other
parties intend to kill the victims). Utah case law supports that co-defendants to the same
criminal episode may not necessarily be liable for the same offense. Thus, under
accomplice liability, if a party maintains his innocence on the greater offense, that does
not necessarily support an acquittal on all lesser included offenses.
In Alvarez, the defendant was convicted of intentional first-degree murder where
two persons were killed during a fight. The defendant's sentence was enhanced under
the "gang enhancement" statute, which required proof of accomplice liability. Defendant
argued the gang enhancement statute could not be applied to him because other parties to
the episode did not intend to kill; they intended to assault. Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 452-53,
461. The Utah Supreme Court relied on the accomplice liability statute and stated,
"[p]arty liability under section 76-2-202 does not require that the persons involved in the
criminal conduct have the same mental state." Id. at 461. That is, one party may have
intent to assault, while another party may have intent to kill. Under accomplice liability,
each party would be responsible only for his own mental state in the matter. IcL
In State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, the defendant and co-defendant hog-tied the
victim in his home, and stole items of personal property. When the house was set on fire,
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-defendant fled w it'll 101 it 1: lelping the victim. IdL_at 422-23. I he
evidence was undisputed that personal property was taken from the home, the house was
set on fire, Hansen was aware of the fire, and the victim died. Id_at 422-23.
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The Hansen case supports that co-defendants maj have different mental states in
the commission of the same act. The different mental states will support convictions for

1 'the state claiih.-* I lan^eri- .- .--*- i ._d a, ; „ „3. ^ ^uu^iA^^nc
because Hansen "w as
completely unaware that his accomplice in those offenses had set fire to the house, from
which he fled/ g a t e ' s Brief at 14.; I hat assertion is incorrect. In Hansen, the
defendant took the witness stand and testified that "while he was searching the house lor
property, he became aware that [co-defendant] Rocco [had] set ii >n h k . vA\'w\ led Hansen to panic and flee" without helping or untying the victim. Hansen. 734 I\2d at 4 2 2 2 3 .
1

1

separate crimes.
Hansen applies here. In this case, the evidence supports that Lund was the victim
of a robbery, Rosillo took money from Lund and walked away with it, and Mallory
pointed a gun at Lund during the robbery.
The evidence further supports that Rosillo became aware that Mallory had a gun
after the robbery was commenced, and Rosillo denied participation in the use of the gun.
That is, Rosillo did not direct Mallory to use the gun, and he did not solicit, request,
encourage, command, or otherwise aid in the use of the gun. Rosillo's "theory was that
his intentional conduct only involved" taking the money from Lund and walking away,
and that his conduct "was a result of panic" after discovering that Mallory had a gun.
(See R. 145:11-15, 27); see.also.Hansen, 734 P.2d at 423. In accordance with Hansen,
Rosillo was entitled to an instruction on the lesser-included offense of robbery, since that
supported his intent as it related to the criminal act. See also Crick, 675 P.2d at 534 (codefendants may be found responsible for different crimes arising from the same episode).
(2) The cases cited by the state in support of its argument are irrelevant. In
connection with the state's argument that the evidence provided a rational basis for acquittal on the greater offense and also "necessarily [supported] an acquittal on the lesser
offense," the state has cited to Shabata, 678 P.2d 785; Baker, 671 P.2d 152; Cox, 826
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I' ?,d hSfi, and Sherard, .*
those cases in its brief

l

v

"

'' - (State's Brief at 12.)" The state does not analyze

See id, at 11-12 (no discussion of cases cited b} stale)) Irdv-i J,

those cases are inapposite.
By way of explanation, in Shabata, (> '8 l\Jd al 'M>> » ml'" dek'iid.inl \. -i1
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denied all involvement in the matter. At trial, defendant requested a lesser-included
offense instruct, jn for mans laughter on the basK \]\J lh« \ k 'i *;v !cafl may have been
caused "in the heat of passion " Tel at '"•>•.
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Utah Supreme <

t
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finding defendant innocent or guilty of the crime charged." IdL "Defendant claimed that
he did not cominit the act" and lir* "(hems ul ddeua: pnrhided ihe n'qiie^ted in^nn i »n
on liiansIaiighU/i

Id

Shabala is distinguishable from this case. Shabata does not

2 The state also has cited to Crick, 675 P.2d at 534. (State's Brief at 12.) That case
stands for the proposition that "[a] defendant can be criminally responsible for an act
committed by another, but the degree of his responsibility is determined by his own
mental state in the acts that subject him to such responsibility, not by the mental state of
the actor." Id (emphasis added); see also Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 461. In Crick, the Utah
Supreme Court recognized that co-defendants may not necessarily be guilty of the same
offense although they participated in the same criminal episode. For example, one codefendant may be guilty of murder while the other may be guilty of manslaughter in :ne
same act. As set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant, that cast supports Rosillo's
argument for the lesser-included oilense instruction. (See Brief of Appellant .n !- ' l} )
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concern defendant's request for a lesser-included offense instruction under an
accomplice liability theory.
Next, the state relies on Baker, 671 P.2d at 152. In that case, defendant was found
in a storage closet of a locked building and was charged with burglary. Defendant argued
at trial that he was too intoxicated to form intent; and he asked the trial court to instruct
the jury on the offense of intentional criminal trespass. Id_at 159-60. The trial court refused, and the supreme court affirmed, on the basis that defendant's evidence of intoxication was meant to negate specific intent, not to prove the existence of intent for criminal
trespass. (See Brief of Appellant, at 28-31, and discussion of Baker therein.) Again, the
case cited by the state is distinguishable since it does not concern accomplice liability.
With respect to Cox, 826 P.2d at 656, the defendant there was charged with
burglary and theft of a cabin in the mountains. Defendant testified that he was not at the
cabin, id at 658, and he claimed he "never entered the cabin." Id.at 663. Nevertheless,
he requested an instruction on the lesser offense of criminal trespass for "entering] or
remaining] unlawfully" on the property. LdL_at n. 2. This Court ruled there was no
"substantial evidence to support a trespass theory." IcL_at 662-63. Since the defendant in
Cox claimed he was not in the vicinity of the crime, it is distinguishable from this matter.
In Sherard, 818 P.2d at 554, defendant was convicted of murder. She requested an
instruction on the lesser-included offense of negligent homicide. This Court recognized
that the jury had been instructed on the lesser offense of manslaughter, but had rejected
12

llilihil illrm.iliM 1 III find d e f e n d a n t guilt" • l • \.roc\
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: .1

Court ruled that

defendant's request for an instruction on negligcni lumicide was insupportable. "[S]ince
the jury convicted of second degree murder despite the fact that an instruction was given
on the lesser included offense of manslaughter, failure to give a n e g u ^ . . . :..:,;

I '.2d 254,267 (Utah 1988)).
The cases set forth above and identified by the state do not constitute controlling
authority on the issue before this Coi in: t They are not helpful to the analysis ^ ^ U > J T ' 9 J 1
, ijiuumuier's Daughter ; 85 1 2 1 1 C 8 ; , 1 : < >C
; . :' does not address the issue before the court, the case cannot constitute controlling
_ a x ; . i ) on the matter); see State V. Ostler. 2001 UT 68,1J6 n.2, 31 P.3d 528 (state relies
on case law that is not dispositive of the issue before the court). On that basis, the state's
argument sh :>i il ;:i 1: e i ejected.
I Ite state3s ii}\ imi i il» fwuld be rejectee •-*/ the basis inai me evidence
supports both an acquittal on the greater offense ami a conviction
offense.

here

on the lesser

The facts and inferences viewed in the light most favorable to Rosillo 5 s request

foi the i obbei > instn ictioi I satisfy 1:1 le secoi I :1 pi oi lg :)f tl: le Baker ai i,ajy sis.
The evidence at trial reflected the following: Rosillo testified that he went "aionu
with" the matter to keep Mallory and. the situation calm; Rosillo acted out of panic aiu
fear when he took I -und's money and wallet; and Rosillo walked away nnh L u u d \

property. (See R. 145:11-15, 27.)
Rosillo denied any involvement with the gun. In fact, he testified he did not realize Mallory had a gun until after they were involved in the robbery. (R. 145:11-17, 27.)
According to the state, "defendant's testimony went only to his innocence on both
the charged offense of aggravated robbery and simple robbery. In sum, because
defendant's entire testimony and any evidence adduced on appeal [sic] was that
defendant played no part in any robbery, there was no rational basis in the evidence for
the requested lesser offense instruction." (State's Brief at 15.) The state's argument
disregards the facts and it ignores the applicable standard for lesser-included offense
instructions. See Baker, 671 P.2d at 158-59; Crick, 675 P.2d at 532 (evidence and
inferences must be interpreted in favor of the request for the lesser-included offense
instruction).
In addition, the state's argument is contrary to the evidence adduced and argument
made by the prosecutor at trial. During Rosillo's cross-examination, the prosecutor
pointed out that when Lund turned over the money and wallet, Rosillo did not protest.
He did not say, "I don't want the money, I don't want to have nothing [sic] to do with
this," and he did not "drop the [items] and say, oh, that's not, that's not my money." (R.
145:31.) At trial, the prosecutor argued the following:
Even Mr. Rosillo admitted that he intended to take [the money]. He held his hand
out, he took the money. It was his intent to take it. Maybe he was trying to
diffuse the situation, as he claims, maybe he was trying to be calm, but he took the
money intentionally. Remember, I asked him, ["]well, did you drop it, did you say
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...,'ii i v\iu.. ..: i\ii- * a,i;- -:::;ig to do with it. , . that's robber)' money?[" "]1 Jo,
i LUUK it.["] That's intentional '! hai what the elements of the crime require. By
his own comments he admits ^
(R. 14 "vol \ TIK- state's argument at trial supports the robbery instruction. Rosillo was
instructed on the lesser-included offense.
In anil U '.ill i ti/slifinl fun hunted p iilieipiitioiii in ilk imbbt n

iiiill nil paniu iiiiiill

fear. (See R. 145:15.) In addition, there was no direct evidence that Rosillo solicited,
i • = qi lested, commanded, directed, or otherwise aided in the u-e of Ihe weapon. Viewed in
the light most fi- u.imL io UK attendant a ratio*.a
greatei offense

MM> existed for an acquittal on the

i........ .

'.hoiihl luive been allowed to decide whether the evidence supported Rosillo's
participation as an accomplice to aggravated robbery; or whether it supported his limited
participation in robbery out of panic and fear.3 For the reasons more tuli\ set l-\ w < a he

3 Additional c\
^ .acitiiiivw v>\ a,w .>;au adj., i.^aa,..
.UJ\MS. ^ee ^ ri,,»\.
P.2d at 533 (cow.:. - _iuses to detail evidence supporting , since that is not in
issue). For example, the state points to evidence thai Rosillo later Handed the IIMIICV ,I id
wallet to Mallon .' Stale's Brief at 13.) That is undisputed and irrelevant. -Ms. >. th Jt
evidence shows \ l a h o n \ menial siate. It does notningto suggest Rosillo intendeu i»r
assisted in the use oi ihe iiim Juring the encounter v »f- ' and
Also, the state points to evidence that "defendant told Oliver Carter that he did
not participate in the robbery." (kJL) That evidence onh supports that Carter's testimony
was in conflict with Rosillo's testimony, requiring the jur\ to resolve the matter. (See R
145:82 (prosecutor points out that testimony from Carter raises a conflict that musi oe
resolved by the jury).) The conflicts in evidence support that jurors should have been
given all appropriate choices to assist them in resolving factual issues at trial.
In addition, the state cites to e\ ems mat occurred after the robbery, including the
arrest and the search of the apartment i hose facts are not in dispute and they add
nothing to the analysis. That evidence supports that Rosillo may be guilty of "some

opening Brief of Appellant, this case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
C. THE STATE'S ARGUMENT REGARDING HARMLESSNESS FAILS TO
RECOGNIZE THAT WHEN THE JURY IS REQUIRED TO RESOLVE
CONFLICTS IN THE EVIDENCE RELATING TO A PIVOTAL ISSUE. THE
TRIAL COURT MUST PROVIDE THE LESSER OFFENSE INSTRUCTION
TO ENSURE THAT MATTERS ARE RESOLVED WITH THE
APPROPRIATE CHOICES.
In considering prejudice in the context of the lesser-included offense analysis, a
reviewing court will not weigh the evidence or assess whether such evidence is sufficient
to support the conviction as charged. Baker, 671 P.2d at 159 (the reviewing court is not
allowed to "weigh the credibility of the evidence," since that function is reserved for the
trier of fact with the appropriate lesser/greater offenses to choose from); State v.
Mitchell 779 P.2d 1116, 1122 (Utah 1989). Rather, the analysis for lesser-includedoffense instructions considers whether there is a "sufficient quantum of evidence to raise
a jury question regarding [the] lesser offense." Baker, 671 P.2d at 159.
That standard serves the purpose of allowing the jury to perform its functions with
all the proper choices. "Society has a legitimate interest in the jury's freedom to act
according to the evidence." Hansen, 734 P.2d at 424 (citing People v. Chamblis, 236
N.W.2d 473, 482 (Mich. 1975)). "Where the defendant requests an instruction of a
lesser included or a related offense and where there is some rational basis in the evidence

offense." Thus, the jury should have been given the appropriate choices in the matter.
See Hansen, 734 P.2d at 424 (facts must be viewed in light most favorable to the request
for the lesser-included offense instruction).
16

on which the jury could find as the defendant requests, the instruction must be given."
Hansen, 734 P.2d at 424. "The rule of Baker is not a mere technical rule designed to trip
up judges and prosecutors. It serves a fundamental policy of permitting the jury to find a
defendant guilty of any offense that fits the facts, rather than forcing it to elect between
the charges the prosecutor chooses to file and an acquittal." IdL Also, "[w]here one of
the elements of the offense charged remains in doubt but the defendant is plainly guilty
of some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its doubts in favor of conviction." In that
instance, it is even more important to ensure that the jury is given proper, alternative
choices in the matter. Id. at 424-25.
Rosillo has argued that this Court should consider "harmlessness" only if the
evidence on the lesser offense "is so slight" that reasonable minds necessarily must
conclude against the defendant on the matter. That harmlessness analysis is consistent
with Utah case law. See State v. Piansiaksone. 954 P.2d 861, 871 (Utah 1998)
(considering whether the evidence was "so slight" that failure to provide lesser-included
offense instruction was harmless); State v. Evans. 2001 UT 22, 1HJ21-22, 20 P.3d 888;
(see Brief of Appellant at 24-27, and discussion concerning Evans).4

4 The state argues that under the prejudice analysis, this Court will consider whether
"the alleged error creates a sufficient likelihood of a different outcome so as to
undermine the reviewing court's confidence in the verdict." (State's Brief at 18-19.) To
the extent the state advocates a prejudice prong that requires the defendant to
demonstrate more than a "quantum of evidence" to raise a jury question regarding the
lesser offense, the state's argument is contrary to Utah law. See. Baker, 671 P.2d at 159.
Also, in connection with its claim that the error was "harmless," the state cites to
17

In this matter, the state claims, "Any error in refusing the requested instruction on
robbery was harmless in light of the compelling evidence of defendant's guilt for
aggravated robbery." (State's Brief at 16.) In support of that claim, the state relies on its
interpretation of the evidence for the "aggravated robbery" conviction. That
interpretation is irrelevant. See Crick, 675 P.2d at 532, 533 (evidence must be viewed in
the light most favorable to the request for the lesser-included offense instruction; court
refuses to detail evidence supporting conviction since that is not in issue); Mitchell, 779
P.2d at 1122 ("sufficiency" standard is inapplicable to prejudice analysis); see also supra,
note 4, herein. Indeed, evidence identified by the state may be categorized in two
respects, both of which support the determination that Rosillo was entitled to an
instruction on the lesser-included offense of robbery.
First, the state cites to undisputed evidence, including the following: Lund did not
see Mallory and Rosillo approach him from behind. When Lund turned around, he
observed Mallory and Rosillo standing in front of him, with Mallory pointing a weapon at
his chest. (State's Brief at 19.) Rosillo took money and a wallet from Lund, then he and
Mallory walked away. Rosillo and Mallory were later apprehended. (See State's Brief at
evidence supporting the verdict on the greater offense. (State's Brief at 16-21.) The
state essentially is relying on a "sufficiency-of-the-evidence" standard for the prejudice
prong. That is an incorrect standard as a matter of law. The Utah Supreme Court
specifically has ruled that the "sufficiency-of-the-evidence" analysis "is not the standard
by which harmless error determinations are to be made." Mitchell 779 P.2d at 1122.
According to the Utah Supreme Court, when a court considers prejudice and harm, "it is
irrelevant that there is sufficient untainted evidence to support the verdict." IcL_
18

19.) Officers found a "wad" of cash on both Mallory and Rosillo and they found a gun
and wallet at the apartment that Rosillo and Mallory shared with their families. (See
State's Brief at 19-20.) The evidence also supports that Rosillo went "along with" the
matter out of panic and fear; he believed he did not "have any choice" and he wanted to
keep Mallory calm. ( See id. at 5-7.) Under the Baker standard, the evidence was
sufficient to support an acquittal for Rosillo on the greater offense of aggravated robbery,
and a conviction on the lesser offense of robbery. See supra subpoint B, herein. Thus,
Rosillo was entitled to have the jury instructed on the lesser-included offense.
Second, the state cites to evidence in conflict and susceptible to alternative interpretations. According to the state, "Defendant said to Lund, 'Give me your money'" and
he requested Lund's wallet. Also, Rosillo played an "active role in the aggravated robbery" by twice making demands of Lund for his money and wallet. (State's Brief at 19.)
Those facts are in conflict with other facts. Specifically, other evidence supported
that Rosillo did not demand Lund's money and wallet. Rather, "Mallory demanded
money from the victim, and although [Rosillo] did not say anything at that point, the
victim handed [] his wallet and a 'wad' of money [to Rosillo]." (State's Brief at 5.) The
record supports that Lund's statements and Rosillo's statements about the matter were
inconsistent, presenting an issue of fact for the jury. Thus, the evidence viewed in the
light most favorable to the request for the instruction on robbery supports that the jury
should have been allowed to resolve the conflicts with all appropriate choices, including
19

an instruction on the lesser-included offense of robbery. See Baker, 671 P.2d at 159.
Finally, contrary to the state's assertions, Rosillo's testimony does not "belie" his
credibility. (State's Brief at 20.) Indeed, his admissions about the robbery bolster his
credibility in the matter. Since Rosillo's credibility was an issue for the jury to resolve,
the jury should have been allowed to assess credibility with the appropriate lesser and
greater offense instructions. See State v. Bvrd. 937 P.2d 532, 536 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)
(court is more likely to find prejudice when defendant's credibility is in issue); State v.
Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486-87 (Utah 1984); State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400, 403 (Utah
1986) (when the evidence in the record is circumstantial or sufficiently conflicting, court
is less likely to find harmless error).
This Court will not make credibility determinations in assessing the issue on
appeal in this case. Baker, 671 P.2d at 159. It simply will decide whether there was a
sufficient quantum of evidence to raise a question for the jury on the lesser-included
offense. Id The evidence here was sufficient. This Court should find that the refusal to
give the lesser-included offense instruction was prejudicial.
CONCLUSION
Rosillo respectfully requests the entry of an order reversing this case for a new trial
where Rosillo may present an instruction to the jury on the lesser offense of robbery.
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